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Investment and Income Responses to Marketing Channel Choice 
The international development community has recently shifted away from the traditional 
technology-push paradigms towards the promotion of market-driven approaches that link 
farmers to markets as the new basis for economic development (World Bank. 2003; 
USAID, 2004).  These new initiatives are recognize that globalization is rapidly changing 
the structure of agriculture and food procurement channels and unless development 
programs actively facilitate farmers’ access to these new marketing channels, farmers 
will be forever excluded and constrained to poverty (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002; 
Reardon et al, 1999).  The paradigm change however raises the important question about 
what is the appropriate marketing channel to use and how do third parties facilitate their 
establishment in an economically sustainable manner. 
Recent research by Key and Runsten (1999), Gow and Swinnen (1998; 2001), GOw et al 
(2000), Dries and Swinnen (2005) and others show that the presence of a combination of 
factors is essential to the establishment of economical sustainable, mutual beneficial and 
welfare increasing marketing channel relationships including macroeconomic stability, 
credible and self-enforcing contractual relationships, and foreign direct investment. Their 
research indicates that although not theoretically required, the presence of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is a necessary condition for economic development.  They show that 
entry of FDI into a market brings credible and enforceable contracts, financial resources, 
technology and know-how, transparency and competitive market pressures.  These 
factors combine to correct farmers’ incentives and result in substantial positive direct and 
indirect income growth, investment growth and overall economic welfare growth driven 
through various vertical and horizontal spillovers.     3
An important policy question remains as to whether similar positive vertical and 
horizontal gains can be achieved without the presence of FDI.  That is can a third-party 
government or non-government organization design, implement, and establish facilitation 
programs the effectively replicate the private FDI induced initiative, achieve similar 
responses and ensure long-term economic stability. 
The Armenian dairy sector provides a natural experiment for analyzing the impact of 
third-party marketing channel establishment and facilitation programs, as Armenia is a 
controlled and bounded environment that has received no FDI.  Within this sector the 
USDA Marketing Assistance Program (MAP) is the exogenous third-party shock that 
replicates FDI.  Starting from 1998, USDA MAP initiated a series of marketing, technical 
and financial assistance programs in the Armenian dairy industry to facilitate the 
establishment of cooperative and private marketing channels to assist farmers access the 
market.  In this paper we analyze and measure the impact that these alternative 
cooperative and private marketing channel choices have on farmers income and 
investment responses. 
During the spring of 2004 an extensive survey of 745 dairy farmers was conducted in 33 
villages of Armenia’s major dairy producing regions to measure and evaluate both the 
short and long-term impact and response of farmers to the USDA MAP involvement in 
the Armenian dairy sector.  Our results empirical results indicate a substantial shift from 
personal consumption of milk to commercial marketing through either milk marketing 
associations or private marketing channels during the period 1999 to 2004.  This shift is 
accompanied by substantial increasing in investment (number of cows) and income.  The 
empirical results indicate that XXXX   4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  The first section discusses the historical 
development of the Armenian dairy industry from soviet times to late transition.  The 
second, third and fourth sections discuss the USDA MAP, current structure of Armenian 
dairy industry and their involvement respectively.  The fifth section discusses the 
research methods and data collection.   
Historical Development of the Armenian Dairy Industry 
During the Soviet era of the 1970s and 1980s the Armenian government encouraged the 
development of the domestic livestock sector through the provision of high investment 
and operational subsidies along with inflated market prices.  These programs fostered: the 
overuse of high cost imported feeds; the development of capital and labor intensive 
operations; the waste of equipment, energy and other inputs; and the concentration of 
large numbers of animals (World Bank, 1995). 
Independence from the Soviet Union, market liberalization, and imposition of economic 
blockades placed the Armenian livestock industry under extreme economic pressure: 
producers’ costs increased substantially for imported feed and inputs; by 1994 they were 
50 percent higher than farmgate output prices. Forage production dropped dramatically as 
farmers shifted production from perennial forage crops to storable annual crops in 
response to food security concerns (Figure 1). And decreased consumer purchasing 
power depressed consumer demand and lowered output prices (World Bank, 1995).  The 
result was the failure of Armenia’s traditional large-scale dairy operations that were no 
longer economically viable (World Bank, 1995).   5
In response the government implemented a livestock privatization program overseen by 
village councils to distribute five cattle and 20 sheep per to the thousands of newly 
independent farmers (Sardaryan, 2001).   Farmers purchased the cattle for very low, 
largely symbolic, prices.  These low (substantially below market) purchase prices - when 
coupled with inadequate livestock housing, poor and costly feed, severe financial distress 
and substantial payments delays by state owned enterprises - meant farmers often sold 
their cattle for an immediate cash windfall (World Bank, 1995).  As a result the livestock 
sector contracted dramatically in the late eighties and early nineties (Figure 2; Figure 3).  
The worst-affected industries were pigs and poultry where numbers were down 75 
percent; however cattle numbers declined by almost 50 percent (Figure 2) and by 1994, 
with few exceptions, most large-scale intensive dairy operations had been either shut 
down or drastically down-scaled (World Bank, 1995). 
Farmers were not alone: the dairy processors faced similar chain coordination, 
procurement, and marketing problems that resulted from a combination of independence, 
the economic blockades, land privatization, decreasing cow numbers, reduced consumer 
purchasing power, limited working capital, and other related events.  These problems 
forced processors to either close or severely reduce output during the early nineties that 
resulted in a dramatic drop in capacity utilization. 
By 1994 however cattle numbers began stabilizing as farmers retained them as a source 
of dairy protein for the family household, as an income source, and as a savings 
instrument to protect their wealth during hyper-inflationary periods (Figure 2).  Many 
Armenia farming families had sufficient cows to meet their own household requirements 
but due to the breakdown in marketing channels and lack of storage facilities and   6
transportation meant that they faced difficulty marketing their excess milk to processors.  
Consequently many dairy processors relied on imported dry milk powder to meet their 
procurement requirements during this period.   
These transition-induced problems made recovery of the Armenian dairy industry a 
difficult proposition.  At the farm level, transition had left farmers financially distressed, 
credit constrained and unprofitable due to increased input prices, decreased output prices, 
and limited market opportunities for selling their milk surplus.  Farmers retreated to 
subsistence agriculture or barter as a result.  Similarly dairy processors were constrained 
by poor quality milk supplies that arrived in inconsistent quantities from farmers, limited 
financial capital, inexperienced management stuck in a Soviet era mentality, poor 
sanitation, poor safety standards, high cost imported milk powder, and finally, inadequate 
or missing procurement relationships with farmers.  The result was a dairy sector in total 
disarray. 
Unlike many CEE countries that had faced a similar collapse during early transition, 
Armenia could not rely upon the rapid entry of multinational food companies to quickly 
restore an economically viable market structure (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Dries et al, 
2004; Dries and Reardon, 2005).  With its small domestic consumption base, both in 
terms of population and purchasing power, Armenia provided an unsuitable foreign 
investment opportunity for multinational food companies.  Consequently, dairy industry’s 
revival would require an alternative external shock, this came from US government 
ODA.   7
Establishment of the USDA Market Assistance Program 
The Armenian government approached the United States government in 1992 with a 
request for assistance in facilitating agricultural transition.   In 1992 the USDA initially 
followed a traditional extension-driven technology-push international development 
approach by placing a policy advisor at the Armenian Ministry of Agriculture and later in 
1993 assisting in the creation of an Armenian extension service.  However, after three 
years of operation it was apparent that the production focus was not meeting industry 
needs.  So in 1996, a USDA advisory team redesigned the project from technology-push 
to market-pull and with that shifted the focus from farmers and production to market and 
business development and the economic recovery of the privatized food processing 
sector.  The result was the USDA Marketing Assistance Project (MAP).  Essentially, 
MAP changed the question from, “What can we produce?” to “what does the market 
demand and how can we profitability meet this demand?”   
The USDA MAP used an integrated market driven approach to business and market 
development encompassing marketing, financial and technical assistance.  This integrated 
approach enabled USDA MAP to assist targeted clients: identify potential market 
demand; develop appropriate marketing channels through marketing assistance; develop 
new products to meet the demand through technical assistance; and provide via various 
instruments the necessary finance resources to mobilize the other components.  The 
USDA MAP was careful to only draw clients (entrepreneurs, farmer groups and 
processing firms) from agribusiness sectors identified as having the potential for 
economic recovery (such as cheese processing, vegetable processing, and wine 
production), even through they could have been harshly affected by transition.   8
To implement its programs, USDA MAP drew upon a permanent Armenian staff and 
various visiting American university faculty and industry volunteers to provide the 
marketing, financial and technical assistance to their clients.  Since its inception, MAP 
has worked with more than 65 different processing firms, who employ more than 2,600 
full time staff and 1,100 seasonal staff and purchase raw materials from 18,000 farmers.  
At the farm level MAP has facilitated the establishment of 33 farmer marketing 
associations  in the dairy cow, dairy goat, and fruit and vegetable sectors, the 
establishment of 48 production credit clubs which provide short term finance for farmer 
groups, and has provided specific technical assistance to farmers in areas such as goat 
and dairy husbandry and water management.  Programs for research, youth, and 
undergraduate and extension education are additional areas within the project.    
When the USDA MAP project was established in 1996 it was targeted at improving the 
livelihoods of rural Armenians, within the fruit and vegetable sector.  However, towards 
the end of 1997, Gagik Sardaryan, USDA MAP Economic Development Advisor, 
questioned MAP’s sole focus on the fruit and vegetable sector and challenged 
management that if the project was intended to benefit rural Armenians, then a large 
proportion of the rural population were not receiving assistance.  Sardaryan was referring 
to the rural population residing mainly in Northern and Southern Armenia who did not 
grow fruit and vegetables as it was infeasible and instead derived the majority of their 
household income from livestock.  Sardaryan’s proposed that USDA MAP shift attention 
and resources toward assistance for and the development of the dairy industry.       9
Armenian Dairy Industry 
The dairy industry is currently Armenia’s largest agricultural sector with 55 percent of 
Armenia’s 335,000 farmers owning 262,000 dairy cows.   Most herds are dual purpose 
and owned by small family farms. Armenian farms have on average 0.93 cows, with 
about 66 percent of farms with cows owning five cows or less. Milk is traditionally used 
for household purposes with any surplus sold to a dairy processor, marketing association, 
private trader, or in the local market.  The average annual milk yield is 1,700 lt/cow/year, 
compared to 2,400 lt/cow/year during the Soviet era, approximately 3500 lt/cow/year in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and approximately 7,500 lt/cow/year in the U.S.   
Milk production is substantially compromised by low genetic potential, poor pastures and 
pasture management systems, inadequate housing, limited low nutritional winter feed, 
poor herd health, and a general lack of animal husbandry and management skills (World 
Bank, 1995).  Pastures are owned and managed by the village; hence pastures suffer from 
poor quality, under-investment, over-use and poor management given their common-
good status.  This is compounded by a lack of improved pasture species, inadequate 
fertilizer, and poor grazing management techniques.  Poor housing conditions with 
inadequate ventilation and poor quality bedding material lead to cow health and milk 
sanitation problems.  Finally, many farmers only began dairy farming after the fall of the 
Soviet Union thus lack sufficient modern farm management knowledge.   
The processing sector is characterized by a few large dairy processors located around the 
capital Yerevan and then numerous smaller cheese and dairy processors located around 
the country in specific dairy farming areas.  Some of the larger facilities are redeveloped   10
Soviet factories; however the majority of large processors have invested in new plants.  
The smaller facilities have generally been established by independent entrepreneurs, 
many of whom previously worked in the state dairy processing facilities during the 
Soviet era.  These facilities often began life adjacent to the entrepreneur’s home or in 
their backyard.  Overall, the quality of Armenian dairy products is low, although there is 
an increasing number of processors, both large and small, producing export quality 
products.  For example, 850 tonnes of cheese was exported in 2003.   
Surplus raw milk is currently purchased by processing firms through various procurement 
channels.  The most common is direct purchase from individual farmers either by the 
processor collecting the raw milk from the farmer, an independent third party working 
between the processor and farmer, or the farmer delivering the milk directly to the 
processing facility.  With the assistance of USDA MAP a number of marketing 
associations with milk cooling tanks have been established.  These associations 
collectively sell the milk of their members directly to processors.  One large processor 
centered in Yerevan has developed a series of privately owned collection centers with 
cooling tanks around the country which they use to accumulate milk before transporting 
to their Yerevan processing facility.  
The Dairy Processing Sector 
Once given the green light, USDA MAP completed a series of feasibility studies, market 
research, and industry analysis to identify firms and regions that were in need of 
assistance.  USDA MAP personnel recognized that for their program to be successful, it 
was critical that the client firms or farmers associations must develop long-term   11
economically sustainable business models that were driven by the market and client firm 
and not USDA.  Consequently, client identification and screening was critical. Potential 
clients were only selected for assistance if their management team possessed sufficient 
entrepreneurial ability and business acumen to succeed along with sufficient social 
capital within the local community to that they could mobilize local producers. 
Recognizing that the key to rural development was the establishment of a long-term 
economically sustainable downstream market for farmers, the USDA MAP strategically 
aimed the majority of their assistance towards market development for the processing 
sector with the idea that the economic benefits would spillover and accrue to farmers 
through backwards vertical spillovers.  
Three processors were initially selected by Sardaryan and his team for assistance in 1998. 
Since then USDA MAP has granted assistance to processors that have approached them 
based upon the set criteria and provided them with a flexible and customized package of 
financial, technical, and marketing assistance aimed at increasing production, improving 
product quality, and market access (Table 1).  Initial assistance generally consisted of 
financial and technical assistance to increase production and improve product quality.   
Once producing sufficient quantities of a high quality product, USDA MAP would follow 
with marketing assistance.   
Financial assistance was delivered in various forms.  Initial assistance usually comprised: 
grants for facility renovation, purchasing cheese making technology, cultures and 
training; working capital loans to purchase milk during the peak season; and leases for 
capital assets, pasteurizers, milk cooling tanks, and other capital equipment.  Although   12
grants provide misaligned incentives compared to leases or loans, they were initially seen 
as a necessary evil required to sufficiently the financial situation of many processors to 
ensure sustainable platforms for later economic growth.  
Technical assistance was directed towards improving both raw milk procurement and 
final product quality.  At the farm level USDA MAP provided technical assistance to 
processors and their farmer suppliers on milk procurement and increasing the quality of 
raw milk sourced from farmers.  At the processing level, assistance supported sanitation, 
cheese making, design of processing facilities, membership in the Larry Cheese Union, 
and educational trips for managers to Poland and the U.S. 
Marketing assistance focused on providing dairy processors with promotional assistance, 
trade show support, market linkages, export assistance and new product development.  
USDA MAP often assists clients first export shipments, but then left them alone to 
manage their markets for themselves.  New clients often request and were granted new 
product development assistance.  This assistance helped increase the range of product 
offered and to offset import competition of European style cheeses. 
Over the period 1998 to 2002, USDA MAP assistance grew substantial both in individual 
assistance and number of processors assisted (Table 1).  The number of processors 
assisted increased 88 percent.  The number of employees per processor increased 175 
percent and the number of suppliers per processor increased 160 percent.  Additionally 33 
percent of the processors producing and exporting export quality cheeses.   
   13
Research Methodology and Data Collection 
This research is concerned with the empirical analysis of the income and investment 
responses of Armenian dairy farmers to third party facilitated (USDA MAP) private and 
cooperative market channels to the alternative tradition marketing channel options.  This 
research is similar to the recent stream on the impact of private solutions in CEEC 
agriculture (Gow & Swinnen, 1998; Foster, 1999; Gow & Swinnen, 1999; Gow et al, 
2000; Walkenhorst, 2000; Gow & Swinnen, 2001; Dries & Swinnen, 2002a; 2002b; 
Cocks & Gow, 2003a; 2003b).  The complication, however, centers on the specific 
context of the Armenian case.  While private solutions to the problems of transition have 
been found and developed in other CEEC, they have not been seen in Armenia.  However 
one unique publicly third party facilitated case has been observed that seems to be 
solving the problem in Armenia, the USDA Marketing Assistance Project (USDA MAP). 
From the initial research in 2002 the research team became interested in empirically 
evaluating and modeling the impact of the USDA MAP facilitated marketing channel 
relationships on Armenian dairy farmers.  To do this we initially followed a systematic 
mixed methods grounded theory approach to the data gathering and analysis (Strauss  
Corbin, 1994).  This inductive research approach allowed us to first develop critical new 
theoretical insights in to the instrumental case under analysis as well as identify the 
critical initial conditions, process components and characteristics for later quantitative 
analysis.   
The initial data collection took place during the fall of 2002 using a combination of 
unstructured interviews and participant observation (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1998).    14
Nineteen unstructured interviews were conducted with agroprocessing firm managers and 
USDA MAP consultants and management.  Participant observation allowed the authors 
to develop a greater understanding of the relevant issues at USDA MAP where they 
actively participated in USDA MAP management meetings, programs, activities and 
client interactions.  From this initial grounding a series of critical issues were identified, 
thus interviews became more structured to extract a deeper understanding of the specific 
issues relating to the dairy industry case.   
Semi-structured interviews were them employed to gain further understanding into the 
underlying critical issues, yet still allow flexibility in the direction of the interviews.  As 
Stake (1995) argues, case study fieldwork often takes the researcher in unforeseen 
directions so having a less structured approach to data collection allows the discovery of 
relevant and important information that the researcher may not have initially considered.   
During November 2003 seventeen semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
cheese and dairy plant managers, owners and presidents, milk marketing association 
managers and presidents, short and long term USDA MAP consultants, the resident long 
term project leader and dairy advisor, USDA MAP permanent staff.  Data triangulation 
was achieved through interviewing multiple parties within each of the relevant groups 
(Stake, 1998). 
Secondary data were collected through a range of publications on Armenia and Armenian 
agriculture, consultancy reports, proposals, and management plans which dated back to 
the start of the project in 1998.     15
Quantitative data was collected with a survey instrument specifically designed, tested, 
and implemented to measure the impact of the USDA MAP program and farmers 
responses.  A stratified random sampling frame was used to purposively select nine 
groups, or strata, each containing three villages.  The survey followed a similar design to 
Dries and Swinnen (2002a; 2002b), Hansen et al (2002), and Simmons et al (2003).  The 
survey had eight sections covering questions related to the milk marketing association, 
financial information, land use and ownership, demographics, general agricultural 
production, specific goat production, investment, and finally farmers involvement in the 
association and community.   The survey was extensively pilot tested and double blind 
reverse translation was used to ensure that the survey questions had the right meaning.   
The survey was administrated during the winter of 2004.  745 dairy farmers were 
surveyed.  Each survey was personal enumerated and took between one and two hours to 
complete.  The survey results were coded, cleaned, and entered into SPSS for analysis. 
Farmer Income and Investment Responses 
Recognizing that assistance beginning from 2000 may have affected the structure of dairy 
milk marketing in Armenia, the survey instrument included reflectionary questions back 
to 1999 designed to elicit any changes in marketing over time.  It is important to 
recognize that in some Marz (areas) and villages, formal marketing channels were 
available in 1999, but these were not linked to the USDA MAP.  In other Marz and 
villages no formal marketing channel existed in 1999, as neither a private dairy processor 
nor a USDA MAP facilitated collection center was available.  Consequently farmers 
marketing decisions were constrained by the available options.   16
The survey instrument separated out 10 different marketing channel structures and 
farmers were asked in each year to specify the channel where the majority of their milk 
was used.  For ease of analysis these channel choices have been compressed into four 
aggregate variables that best reflect the organization structure of these channels: 
Cooperative (COOP), Private channel (PRIVATE), Personal Consumption (HOME), and 
other (OTHER).   The Cooperatives grouping includes all farmers who are selling to one 
of the farmers associations that cooperatively own and operate the milk cooler and 
collection centers; Private Channel which includes the delivery of milk directly to a milk 
plant or privately owned collection center; Personal consumption which includes 
personal consumption as liquid milk and as a processed milk product, probably cheese; 
and Other which includes barter, sale of fresh milk and milk products in the local village 
or market, and sale to traders or middlemen.   Table 3 summaries the changing choice in 
marketing channel used by farmers over the period 1999 to 2004 in each of the eight 
marz.  In most Marz a dramatic shift towards commercial marketing channels 
(cooperatives & private) can be observed when those channels are available.  For 
example in Lori Marz, 50% of the farmers who had either been selling their milk through 
informal channels (other) or personal consumption in 1999 shifted to marketing their 
surplus milk through formal channels (cooperatives & private).  Similar shifts can be 
observed in Tavash, Aragatotn, and Gerharkunik Marz.  In Syunik Marz, where no 
commercial milk processor operated, the introduction of a farmers association resulted in 
a rapid shift to this cooperative  marketing channel over the six years.  Similarly in 
Kotayk and Shirak Marz similar shifts to commercial private channels were observed.  
Although the speed and number of farms shifting varies across Marz, a clear picture   17
develops out of Table 3 showing that the majority of farmers who previously sold their 
surplus milk through the ad hoc informal marketing channels (other) rapidly switched to 
commercial channels (cooperatives & private) once they become available. Similar, but 
not necessarily as dramatic shifts are seen from personal consumption to commercial 
marketing (cooperatives & private).  This slower response may result from farmers in 
these marz having alternative income sources. 
To better understand the impact of these new marketing channel opportunities on 
farmers, we have graphed and conducted t-tests and ANOVA on the resulting investment 
decisions (number of cows) and income derived from the alternative marketing channels 
compared to comparable farmers within the same village groupings.  Figures 1 and 2 
shows the resulting dynamics for Group 1 where farmers associations have become the 
dominant marketing channel by 2003.  The t-test results indicate that the numbers of 
cows per farm and income levels per farm for Cooperative group are not statistically 
significantly different from the other three comparison groups in both 1999 and 2003 at 
the 10% significance level.  However when the change in numbers of cows and income 
over time was tested across groups, we find that the slope of change in income for the 
cooperative group is statistically different with a 5% significance level, compared to each 
of the other three groups.  This indicates that although we do not observe a statistical 
difference in absolute values, the farmers who joined the associations started with a mean 
income below both personal consumption and private market and have observed the 
largest gain in income of the 5 year period.  A possible explanation for the observed 
results is that the farmers who initially faced low levels of relative income compared to 
their village peers had the appropriate incentives to band together and collectively   18
approach the USDA MAP for assistance in establishing a cooperative compared to their 
peers who, although not having statistically different incomes, are observably better off 
than the farmers association members.   
Figures 3 and 4 show the results for Group 2 where delivery to a private dairy processor 
or collection center has become the predominate channel of choice.  These results 
indicate a quite different set of responses.  Firstly, the farmers delivering to the private 
channels have statistically significantly more income and number of cows over all years 
than their fellow villagers as well as all villages in Group 1 or 3.  Additionally, the rate of 
increase in cow numbers and income for private channel farmers is significantly higher 
than the other farmers.  This seems to indicate two key outcomes.  First, private dairy 
companies chose to locate their collection centers in villages that possess wealthier 
farmers with larger numbers of cows.  This makes economic sense for the companies as it 
minimizes their procurement transaction costs.  Second, once these private channels are 
established, farmers rapidly respond to the market incentives by further investing in dairy 
production.   
Interestingly, the rate of growth in income and cow numbers is not statistically different 
between farmer association members in Group 1 and farmers marketing to private 
channels in Group 2.  This seems to indicate that although these farmers started at 
statistically different resource base levels, the establishment of a suitable marketing 
structures and organizations coupled with the introduction of correct incentives results in 
similar economic responses by farmers.  This finding matches the ad hoc evidence 
provided by Ashtarak Kat dairy processor who has recently begun shifting their focus 
away from establishment of private collection centers to supporting USDA MAP   19
established farmers associations as their preferred strategy for expansion of their 
procurement base. 
Ordered Probit Analysis 
To statistical measure the statistic impact of these separate marketing channels on 
farmers’ income levels an ordered probit analysis was completed on both the complete 
data set of all 745 farmers and a partitioned dataset of 408 farmers who started in private 
consumption.  An ordered probit analysis was required as the farmers incomes were 
measured in by ascending sized income blocks (Table 4).  The size of each income block 
increases the further one gets away from zero.  This analysis was completed using the 
statistical package STATA. 
The dependent and explanatory variables are summarized in Table 4.  COWS 99 and 
INCOME99 measure the farmer’s initial situation in 1999 before the USDA MAP began.  
COWCHANGE measures the change in cow numbers.  ANLANCUL03 measures arable 
cultivated land in 2003.  PMCUL03 measures the amount of pastures and meadows 
owned and cultivated by the farmer (this does not include common village pasture and 
meadows).  AGE and EDUC measure the age and number of years of education of the 
head of the household.  FMEMBER measures the number of family members in the 
household.  WAGEINC measures the proportion of household income that comes from 
wage income.  REMINC measures the amount of remittances that are returned to the 
household from family members living overseas.  NONAGINC measures the proportion 
of income that the household receives from non agricultural activities, excluding wage 
activities.  LOANSIZE measures the current size of outstanding loans that the farmer   20
holds with other entities.  This includes banks, credit clubs, friends and relatives.  COOP, 
PRIVATE, OTHER and HOME are the dummy variables indicating where that the 
farmer marketed the major of his milk production.  YRINCOOP AND YRINPRIVATE 
are variable that measure the number of years that the farmer has been marketing his milk 
though either of these channels. 
The results of two separate ordered probit models are estimated and shown in Table 5.  
The models use dummy variables COOP, PRIVATE and OTHER to measure the 
marketing channel that farmers where selling though in 2003 with HOME being the 
residual channel.  The results from the first model full sample shown on the left of the 
table use the complete 708 farmers in the dataset irrespective of which marketing channel 
they sold milk through in 1999.  The second model partitioned, to the right, shows the 
results for farmers who were using all of their milk for personal consumption in 1999, but 
in 2003 could have been selling through any of the four channel options. 
Just as the previous graphical analysis indicated, the farmer’s initial conditions in 1999 
INCOMWR99 and COW99 have positive and statistically significant impact on the 
farmers income in 2003.  Similarly, change in cow numbers of the past 4 years and 
amount of cultivated arable land have positive and statistically significant impact of 
farmer’s income.  This is all self explanatory.  The amount of owned pasture and 
meadows has no impact and is likely due to the fact that most pasture and meadow is 
common property to the whole village.  So the number of cows or income is not 
constrained by ownership and control of pastures or meadows, but instead access and 
availability of suitable high quality feed on common lands.  Age, education and number   21
of family members were all statistically insignificant.  These results hold over both the 
full and partitioned datasets. 
Evaluating alternative and supplementary source of incomes bring up some important 
differences and possible implications.  Both WAGEINC and REMINC are positively 
statistically significant in the full model however their significance is reduced in the 
partitioned model.  This seems to indicate that WAGEINC and REMINC are relatively 
more important sources of income for farmers who were not solely subsistence farmers in 
1999.  This may result from non partitioned farmers having better access and opportunity 
to gain both wage income and remittances due to location advantages relative to 
subsistence farmers.  NONAGINC has a negative statistically significant impact on 
income in the full model, but no impact in the partitioned model.  This result is likely 
explained by the factor that entrepreneurial individuals who pursue non-agricultural 
activities are likely to reinvest all of their excess cash flow back into their businesses; 
therefore the pursuit of such endeavors will negatively impact household income.  
LOANSIZE is only statistically significant for the full data, indicating that it is only 
farmers who were engaged in the formal channels in 1999 who have statistically been 
able to access and leverage external capital to increase income.   
As for marketing channel choice, the results indicate that COOP is positively statistically 
significant in both models, whereas PRIVATE is only positively statistically significant 
in the full model.  These results support the previous graphical analysis and indicate that 
private companies are likely to be choosing locations where villages have high average 
number of cows per farm and only farmers with sufficient cow numbers can access these 
channels.  However, for farmers who were previously using their milk for personal   22
consumption and have shifted to private marketing, their income has not statistically 
changed with the shift in marketing channel, even though graphically a positive slope can 
be observed in Figure 4. 
Discussion 
This paper examines farmer responses to alternative third-party facilitated 
establishment of commercial private and farmer association marketing channels and 
impacts on farmers channel choice, incomes, and investment.  The USDA MAP and the 
Armenian Dairy industry were used as an instrumental case study to gain a greater 
understanding of the issues, responses and impact involved in this process.  The 
Armenian dairy industry provides a natural experiment for the evaluation of this as there 
has been no foreign investment within the industry nor external ODA before the USDA 
MAP program began in 1999.  A mixed methods approach combining qualitative and 
quantitative data collection and analysis was used. 
The results indicate that the establishment of economically sustainable marketing 
channels (both private and farmers associations) can have a substantial impact on local 
farmers.   Ad hoc case evidence indicates that private processors will initially target 
villages with larger or wealthier farmers as their preferred location for the establishment 
of private collection facilities.  This is supported by survey evidence.  Once established 
farmer who market through these new channels observe faster income growth, they 
respond by increasing cow numbers and this builds upon itself.  For villages 
characterized by smaller, less wealthy farmers, the introduction of the USDA MAP 
farmer association model resulted in similar gains, just from a lower initial starting point.    23
Interestingly, interview responses indicate that private processors have recognized the 
responses induced by the establishment of farmer associations and have recently begun 
working closely with the USDA MAP to support the establishment of additional 
associations as their preferred procurement model for expansion. 
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Table 1: Dairy processors receiving assistance from USDA MAP as at end of 2002 
 










Agroholding Shirak  2002  2002  58  t  - 
Andranik Papikyan  Aragatsotn  2000  2001  300 t  - 
Armavir Kat  Armavir  1996  2002  700 t  - 
Ashtarak Kat  Yerevan  1996  2002  621 t
1  - 
Ashotsk Cheese Plant  Shirak  1996  1998  800 t  3 % 
Boti Cooperative  Aragatsotn  1994  2001  615 t  7 % 
Chanakh Kotayk  1991  2000  600  t  - 
Dustyr Melanya  Lori  1996  1998  800 t  52 % 
Gnel Khachatryan  Gegharkunik  1997  2000  270 t  - 
G. Atoyan & Friends   Shirak  1997  1998  183 t  - 
Khak Ararat  1995  2002  250  t  - 
Mastarachedo Aragatsotn  1999  2000  303  t  - 
Saraghar Tavush  2002  2002  34  t  - 
Village Group  Lori  2000  2000  1,200 t  19 % 
Vordi Armen  Kotayk  2000  2000  430 t  18 % 
Source: USDA MAP 2002 marketing audit 
Table 2: Farmer numbers and development of milk marketing association 2000 – 
2003    
Association (# of villages)  Region  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Lejan (3)  Lori 161  411  430 496 
Elita (5)  Lori -  60  250  300 
Tolors (1)  Syunik -  67 56  54 
Vahan (1)  Gegharkunik -  45  72  110 
Lendrush (1)  Shirak - 27  0  0 
Puskino (1)  Lori -  34  56 67 
Rosa (1)  Gegharkunik -  32  31  32 
Akhalatian (3)  Syunik -  -  48  60 
Khosrov Kat (1)  Ararat -  -  -  33 
Emulik (1)  Tavush -  -  -  32 
Aran-Vard (1)  Aragatsotn -  -  -  33 
Spitak (1)  Lori - -  -  31 
Aygut (1)  Gegharkunik -  -  -  34 
Agarak (1)  Lori - -  -  33 
Sverdlov (1)  Lori - -  -  32 
Van (1)  Ararat -  -  -  32 
Total farmers    161  676  943  1,379 
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Table 3: Number of Farms per Market Channel by Marz (1999 to 2003) 
MARZ  Cooperative Private  Channel Personal Consumption Other Total
year
Lori 1999 25 25 49 43 142
2000 32 28 46 36 142
2001 47 42 26 27 142
2002 46 44 26 26 142
2003 48 46 23 25 142
2004 59 43 20 20 142
Tavush
1999 3 2 37 11 53
2000 5 2 37 9 53
2001 8 2 36 7 53
2002 10 3 35 5 53
2003 19 4 28 2 53
2004 21 3 26 3 53
Aragatsotn
1999 1 4 81 36 122
2000 1 16 74 31 122
2001 1 27 64 30 122
2002 1 32 60 29 122
2003 1 33 58 30 122
2004 25 40 48 9 122
Syunik
1999 1 0 54 17 72
2000 2 0 53 17 72
2001 32 0 30 10 72
2002 54 0 16 2 72
2003 59 0 12 1 72
2004 59 0 12 1 72
Gegharkunik
1999 0 1 81 32 114
2000 0 5 83 26 114
2001 4 19 74 17 114
2002 5 22 72 15 114
2003 10 29 63 12 114
2004 34 30 44 6 114
Kotayk
1999 0 18 55 21 94
2000 0 25 50 19 94
2001 0 33 44 17 94
2002 0 34 44 16 94
2003 0 35 43 16 94
2004 0 38 43 13 94
Shirak
1999 0 60 40 18 118
2000 0 70 31 17 118
2001 0 100 13 5 118
2002 0 109 5 4 118
2003 0 110 4 4 118
2004 0 106 5 7 118
Armavir
1999 0 0 20 10 30
2000 0 0 18 12 30
2001 0 1 17 12 30
2002 0 1 18 11 30
2003 0 1 17 12 30
2004 0 1 18 11 30  
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Table 4: Description of Variables 




6.9825 3.7876 6.3549 3.8759
INCOMWR99
6.0175 3.5511 5.6043 3.6426
COW99 Number of cows in 1999 3.9369 5.2538 3.3093 4.5933
COWCHANGE
0.8309 5.2898 0.5300 2.5019
ARLANCUL03
1.6900 3.0274 1.4145 2.0930
PMCUL03
1.5214 3.1519 0.9736 2.2251
Farmer 
Information
AGE Age of the farmer (years)
45.9529 13.1179 46.7981 13.5621
AGE2
2283.517 1305.846 2373.548 1371.426
EDUC Farmer's education (years) 10.7594 2.2501 10.6322 2.1569
EDUC2
120.8212 48.2437 117.6851 45.8336
FMEMBER
5.5624 2.1302 5.3946 2.1132
WAGEINC Proportion of income from wages 0.1114 0.2206 0.1057 0.2240
REMINC
0.0284 0.1178 0.0292 0.1223
NONAGINC
0.0242 0.1126 0.0230 0.1056
Access to 
Credit
LOANSIZE Amount of current loan (US $)





0.1839 0.3877 0.1559 0.3632
PRIVATE
0.3463 0.4761 0.2398 0.4275
OTHER
0.1369 0.3440 0.5707 0.4956
 
HOME
0.3329 0.4716 0.0336 0.1803
YRINCOOP
0.3758 0.9178 0.2206 0.6196
YRINPRIVATE
0.7490 1.7871 0.3525 0.8452
Full Sample  Partitioned Sample
Farmer's education (years) 
squared






Description            
Change in number of cows from 
1999 to 2003 
Area of arable land cultivated in 
2003
Area of pastures and meadows 
cultivated in 2003
Farmer's income in 2003 (income 
categories 1to 15 )
Farmer's income in 1999 (income 
categories 1to 15 )
Proportion of income from non 
agricultural activities
Number of years in Milk 
Marketing Cooperative 
Number of years that farmer is 





Consuming milk at home (1=Yes)
Number of people living in 
household
Selling milk throught Milk 
Marketing Cooperative (1=Yes)
Selling milk to privatelly owned 
processing plant (1=Yes)
Selling milk trough other 
marketing channels (1=Yes)
Proportion of income form 
remittances
 
   27
Table 5: Results for models with marketing channels as dummies  




INCOMWR99 0.4674 0.000 0.5286 0.000
COW99 0.0212 0.013 0.0235 0.062
COWCHANGE 0.0451 0.000 0.0925 0.000
ARLANCUL03 0.0373 0.037 0.0766 0.006
PMCUL03 -0.0068 0.620 0.0080 0.747
AGE 0.0034 0.846 -0.0271 0.262
AGE2 -0.0001 0.398 0.0001 0.640
EDUC -0.0583 0.440 -0.1240 0.247
EDUC2 0.0050 0.149 0.0077 0.116
FMEMBER -0.0148 0.428 0.0083 0.748
WAGEINC 0.3307 0.065 0.3432 0.157
REMINC 1.0912 0.001 0.7375 0.092




0.0001 0.044 0.0001 0.691
COOP 0.5043 0.000 0.3937 0.009
PRIVATE 0.3359 0.001 0.2102 0.126
OTHER 0.1353 0.282 0.3777 0.194
Cut Points Coef. Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err.
Cut1 0.0564 0.6012 -0.7951 0.8208
Cut2 0.6971 0.6006 -0.1092 0.8202
Cut3 1.3780 0.6008 0.6445 0.8182
Cut4 1.6726 0.6010 1.0496 0.8169
Cut5 2.0737 0.6020 1.4637 0.8175
Cut6 2.6672 0.6038 2.0794 0.8208
Cut7 3.2397 0.6061 2.7246 0.8244
Cut8 3.6784 0.6087 3.2099 0.8272
Cut9 4.4192 0.6131 3.9719 0.8344
Cut10 4.9946 0.6161 4.5168 0.8409
Cut11 5.3384 0.6184 4.9316 0.8454
Cut12 5.8021 0.6217 5.5075 0.8501
Cut13 6.3544 0.6280 6.2085 0.8591































































































Figure 2: Change in avg. income per household from 1999 to 2003 in Group 1 
 














































































Figure 4: Change in avg. income per household from 1999 to 2003 in Group 2 
 